Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: International Justice in a Modern American Court? by Rohlik, Josef
FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA:
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN A MODERN
AMERICAN COURT?
Josef Rohlik*
If a Paraguayan citizen, A, arrived in Missouri and found there
another Paraguayan citizen, B, A could commence a tort suit in a
Missouri state court against B and the Missouri court would have
jurisdiction if B were properly served, even if the tort was com-
mitted in Paraguay. This would be true even if both A and B were
in the United States only for a short stay, despite the widely shared
view that "jurisdiction based on service on one only transitorily
present in the United States is no longer acceptable under inter-
national law if that is the only basis for jurisdiction and the action
in question is unrelated to the United States."1 If B moved to
dismiss for forum non conveniens, the motion probably would be
granted if B were in Missouri for a short stay only. If, however, A
could prove that no other forum was available to him, the
Missouri court probably would proceed to hear the case on the
merits.! The court then would be faced with a choice of law issue
and most likely would decide the controversy according to the law
of Paraguay.' Under international law, the exercise of jurisdiction
to adjudicate could be either wrongful (e.g., based upon a very
short stay) or not,' no matter which court in the United States
would decide the matter, on the basis of internal jurisdictional
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Editors'
Notes § 441, at 162-63 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]. See also id at 159-60.
' See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
' In the hypothetical situation in question, ie., if A and B were in the United States only
transitorily, both resided in Paraguay, and the tort occurred in Paraguay, most courts in
the United States would find a "false conflict." No matter what kind of analysis would be
used, the courts very likely would consider this situation to be purely local (ie., related only
to Paraguay). Furthermore, United States courts have been mindful of the fact that an in-
ternational element may present problems not present in cases involving only an interstate
element. In Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Area Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966), the court observed: "There are obvious implica-
tions to be considered in respect of the degree of comity which should obtain between
sovereign nations unrestrained by a full faith and credit clause in a world constitution." Id.
at 473 n.10.
' Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 441-443.
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rules. Equally, the domestic allocation of jurisdiction among
various courts, e.g., federal courts and state courts, is of no impor-
tance in international law. The same applies to jurisdiction to
prescribe (a state's own rule governing the situation in question).'
Application of lex fori or the result reached under lex fori is
either wrongful under international law or not. Even if the exercise
of jurisdiction under international law is not wrongful, a variety of
statements by judges may be offensive to foreign States and,
possibly, such statements may influence the foreign relations of
the United States. It should be noted that the United States
Supreme Court has addressed this issue.'
In international law, jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction
to prescribe more often than not are intertwined Under Tent-
ative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States,9 the general criterion is reasonableness. The
Tentative Draft reflects the modern development of jurisdictional
concepts in international law,"0 accepted at least by the Western
nations. The Tentative Draft's treatment of jurisdiction draws on
the evolution of the minimum-contacts doctrine in United States
conflict of laws practice. The specific bases of jurisdiction reflect,
of course, the classical jurisdictional notions in international law:
territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction based on
effects, universal jurisdiction, and so on. The reasonableness concept
Compare id. §§ 402-404.
' This principle extends, of course, to the application of any law other than lexfori, but it
would be highly unlikely that the Missouri court would apply, e.g., Japanese law to resolve
our hypothetical case.
' See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). For example, Justice Douglas wrote:
"As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seem that foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or
thawing of the 'cold war,' and the like are the real desiderata. Yet they of course are mat-
ters for the Federal Government, not for local probate courts." Id. at 438-39. It may be of in-
terest to note that, in Filartiga, Judge Kaufman wrote:
[Wie note that the foreign relations implications of this [forum non conveniens]
and other issues the district court will be required to adjudicate on remand
underscores the wisdom of the First Congress in vesting jurisdiction over such
claims in the federal district courts through the Alien Tort Statute. Questions of
this nature are fraught with implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore
should not be left to the potentially varying adjudications of the courts of fifty
states.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 402-404, 441-443, Comments, Reporter's Notes.
' Id., Editor's Notes § 441, at 159-60, 162-63.
"0 The United States has the lion's share in this development. United States assertion of
jurisdiction in antitrust and other matters elicited strong reactions and helped to focus on
the need to adopt more functional approaches to jurisdictional issues. Compare RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at 89-93.
ESSAYS ON FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA
is a balancing factor between the national interest of two or more
states in the exercise of jurisdiction in cases where such exercise
generally is not accepted by states and where the existence of a
more specific basis for jurisdiction is in doubt. Acceptance of a
particular (perhaps emerging) basis of jurisdiction or of the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in specific situations by a sizeable number of
nations remains, however, the most important criterion of legali-
ty. For the purposes of this article, no more need be said about
jurisdiction in international law or about the Tentative Draft, ex-
cept for the concept of "universal jurisdiction."
Universal jurisdiction is based upon acceptance of the exercise
of jurisdiction in situations where a regular jurisdictional contact
does not exist. It is exceptional and traditionally reserved for a
few heinous crimes perpetrated by individuals against the whole
of mankind. Hence, in the case of piracy, the old adage holds that
pirates are hostii humani generis. Judge Kaufman, in Filartiga,
concludes his opinion with this old phrase, extending it to a tor-
turer: "Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."" There is no doubt
that universal jurisdiction must rest on a treaty or on customary
international law. Under section 443 of the Tentative Draft, 2
universal jurisdiction to adjudicate exists where the State has
jurisdiction to prescribe. Section 404 of the Tentative Draft, which
addresses the issue of jurisdiction to prescribe, reads:
A state may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain of-
fenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps terrorism, even
where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is pre-
sent.'"
The text of sections 443 and 404 reflects, and the Reporters men-
tion, that "states have exercised jurisdiction on the basis of
universal interests in the form of criminal law."'4 According to the
Reporters, "international law does not preclude application of non-
criminal law on this basis."'5 It is interesting that the Reporters
" 630 F.2d at 890.
"2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 443.
I l& § 404.
, Id. at 115.
15 Id
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mention the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, of 1975.1 The
Reporters also mention that a convention on this subject is being
prepared by the Commission of Human Rights and note that "such
agreements are effective only among the parties, but if customary
law comes to accept any of these offenses as subject to universal
jurisdiction . .. any state will be justified in exercising jurisdiction
with respect to the offense wherever and by whomever com-
mitted." 7
The reader noticed that the comments above rely on the
Tentative Draft. Although the prior Restatement was not known
for extraordinary accuracy in interpretation of international law,
this writer finds the comparison between the Tentative Draft and
the opinion in Filartiga interesting. At any rate, there is not much
of a jurisprudence of national courts in the area of international
human rights and decisions on this topic rendered by national
courts in the foreseeable future will be rendered primarily by
courts of the Western nations.
The facts in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala are quite simple. Dr. Joel
Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly Filartiga, brought a wrongful
death action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York against Pena-Irala for allegedly torturing
and killing their son and brother, Joelito Filartiga, in 1976 in
Paraguay. At that time, the defendant was Inspector General of
police in Paraguay. In 1979, when the action was brought, the
plaintiffs and the defendant were Paraguayan citizens. Each had
entered the United States on a visitor's visa. Judge Kaufman men-
tioned that Dolly Filartiga had applied for political asylum and
thus it could be inferred that she intended to reside in the United
States when the action was brought. Pena-Irala entered the
United States in 1978, remained in the United States beyond the
term of his visa, and "was served with a summons and civil com-
plaint at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where he was being held pend-
ing deportation."' 8 Subsequently, Pena-Irala was deported. It was
alleged that Joelito was tortured and killed because of his father's
political activities. Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action in
Paraguay against Pena-Irala, which was still pending at the time
of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals. According
" G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at 116.
" 630 F.2d at 879.
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to an affidavit of defendant's Paraguayan counsel, a civil action
was available in Paraguay.
To establish federal jurisdiction, plaintiffs relied upon the Alien
Tort Statute, 9 which reads: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." Defendant moved to dismiss both for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and on forum non conveniens grounds.
The district court dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional
grounds on May 15, 1979. The district court relied on dicta in
Dreyfus v. von Finck' and IT v. Vencap, Ltd.21 stating that the
law of nations, as employed in section 1350, excludes that law that
governs a State's treatment of its own citizens.' The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The reversal also
was urged by the United States in its amicus curiae brief." Judge
Kaufman wrote for the unanimous court:
[We] conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law
of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous, and admits
of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens ....
[I]nternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people
vis-a-vis their own governments. While the ultimate scope of
those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and
elaboration, we hold that the right to be free from torture is
now among them."
Section 1350 requires that the facts alleged in the complaint
state a claim in "tort ... committed in violation of the law of na-
tions .. ."2, i e., a wrongful act under customary international law.
The court relied on the opinions of qualified publicists,' the U.N.
Charter, the Universal Declaration on the Protection of All Per-
sons from Being Subjected to Torture .... I and several interna-
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
' 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
" 630 F.2d at 880.
' The view of the United States coincides with the view of the circuit court. One cannot
help but wonder whether court decisions in the area of human rights would fit the concept
of "quiet diplomacy" of the new administration.
' 630 F.2d at 884-85.
' The court concluded that there is no "treaty of the United States" applicable in this
case.
" See 630 F.2d at 879 n.4.
V G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doe. A/10034 (1975). Article 1
reads in part:
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tional tribunals, as well as the general practice of States. The
court also noted that torture is a crime under municipal laws, in-
cluding Paraguayan law.
The opinion of the court, which is likely to become a cause
celibre, dealt meticulously with sources of international law and
no doubt will appear in textbooks. It is to be particularly ap-
preciated that Judge Kaufman made every effort to avoid a trap
of dealing too nonchalantly with U.N. declaratory resolutions.
Judge Kaufman acknowledged the requirement that a rule of
general customary law must command the "general assent of...
nations.... [Wlere this not so, the courts of one nation might feel
free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of
applying international law."' On this point, Judge Kaufman
distinguished Filartiga from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino,2 stating that the two cases are "diametrically opposed"
because "there are few if any issues in international law today on
which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a State's
power to torture persons held in its custody."' 3 To explain, and
perhaps to soften somewhat, this strong statement, Judge Kauf-
man referred to the Department of State's Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1979, which acknowledges that
"there is no doubt that these rights are often violated; but virtual-
ly all governments acknowledge their validity."31 The court found
the prohibition against torture to be specific and positioned this
"rule" against mere programmatic statements on a variety of sub-
jects in numerous U.N. declaratory resolutions. This is done much
more strongly and explicitly in the United States amicus curiae
brief, which mentions "principles that are considered desirable
but incapable of immediate realization and those provisions that
codify fundamental human rights. 32
It is in this context that one should view Judge Kaufman's ac-
ceptance of the proposition that U.N. declaratory resolutions are
1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at
the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other per-
sons....
28 630 F.2d at 881.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
630 F.2d at 881.
31 Id. at 884.
32 Amicus curiae brief for the United States at 14, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980).
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evidence of customary law or, at least, of expectations of nations.
It should be noted that Filartiga presents a suitable fact situation
for the opinion. According to plaintiffs' allegations, Joelito's body
bore signs of torture, and Pena-Irala's confederate confessed to
the killing. There is no need, then, to muse about whether a fifty-
year sentence to a substandard prison imposed on a teenager for
the sale of a couple of marijuana cigarettes is tantamount to men-
tal or physical torture.
Contemporary international law and the views of nations are,
unfortunately, not as straightforward as the court would have it.
It is one thing to state that a variety of rules in the human rights
area are norms of international law. It is quite another thing to
conclude that "official torture now is prohibited .... [That] [tihe
prohibition .. . admits of no distinction between treatment of
aliens and citizens ... [and that] international law confers fun-
damental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments."'
Stricto sensu, the question should be whether nations have
assented to the universal jurisdiction of national courts of foreign
States to sit in judgment on the violation under international law
of human rights of a State's citizens committed by State officials
acting under the color of official authority within the State's
jurisdiction. Little does it matter whether such decisions serve
the purpose of establishing jurisdiction to adjudicate only.' It is
almost redundant to point out that the current practice of nations
in the area of human rights reflects the struggle between the em-
phasis by socialist States and many developing nations on the
classical concept of sovereignty, subjects of international law and
domestic jurisdiction under article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, and
the deeply felt commitment toward human rights and their
realization by individuals "in the whole world" by a minority of
Western democracies committed to the rule of law.
Professor Sohn, commenting on Filartiga in this issue of the
Georgia Journal,' wrote that the Filartiga court "took an expan-
sive view of international law." Professor Falk, one of the scholars
who submitted his views to the Filartiga court, has suggested
' 630 F.2d at 884-85.
' There is no doubt that Filartiga (irrespective of any distinction between the decision
on the merits and on jurisdiction and between dictum and ratio decidendi) is not just
another decision in a wrongful death or personal injury case involving a foreign element.
' Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307
(1981. Professor Sohn very kindly made his comments available to this writer prior to
publication.
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three perspectives of international law: positivism, neo-natural
perspective, and world order perspective." Obviously, the Filar-
tiga decision would not fit the positivist perspective. For this
writer, the issue is one of the progressive application of interna-
tional law in general and of the application of international law by
national courts in particular. The cause of international law and
justice demands application of international law by national
courts. Although there are unambiguous rules of treaties and
customary law and although national courts occasionally will be
bound by an international rule transformed into a domestic
statute, it is in the nature of international law that anyone who in-
terprets it is always faced with its constantly changing nature, in-
deed, to refer to Wolfgang Friedmann, the changing structure of
international law; with the process of development, i.e., with the
process of transition between a dying rule to which some nations
cling, and an emerging rule, upon which other nations insist. The
touchstone of acceptability of interpretation for this writer con-
tributes to a goal that is reasonably well-defined and generally ac-
cepted by a number of nations. Although it is difficult to establish
precise criteria of progress, resort to the historical development
of mankind allows one to feel it. The Filartiga decision is an im-
portant, goal-oriented decision of an American court, which is to
be applauded. It would be unthinkable for an American court to
interpret international law in any other way than the Filartiga
court did. Judge Kaufman's reliance on the words of nations em-
bodied in the U.N. declaratory resolutions on human rights was
justified, no matter how hypocritical the words and votes in the
General Assembly might be.
Two short observations should be added. The court did not com-
ment on the question of forum non conveniens despite the fact
that the United States, in the amicus curiae brief, suggested that
the district court could declare itself forum non conveniens
because "the parties and the conduct alleged in the complaint
have . . . little contact with the United States."37 To plaintiffs'
assertion that a tort suit in Paraguay would be a sham, the United
States responded: "For reasons of comity among nations,
however, such an assertion should not be accepted absent a very
clear and persuasive showing. In determining whether abstention
N Address by Falk, American Society of International Law, 75th Annual Meeting (Apr.
23, 1981).
" Amicus curiae brief for the United States at 25 n.48, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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is appropriate, the court should also consider the fact that the
defendant has been deported."' No need exists to comment on the
United States confusion of the abstention doctrine with that of
forum non conveniens. If the plaintiffs' allegations are true, the
tort suit in Paraguay indeed would be a sham, especially if the
plaintiffs emigrated to the United States. It is not to be
underestimated that in foreign policy it is sometimes useful to
make a point but to avoid a result thought to be objectionable (in
this case to Paraguay). It is submitted, however, that the district
court, if it declared itself to be forum non conveniens, would admit
that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would be
unreasonable because of insufficient contacts with the forum.
Abstracting from universal jurisdiction, the court would have ter-
ritorial jurisdiction. Were it not for Pena-Irala's deportation, one
could conclude easily that the parties intended to stay in the
United States and avail themselves of all the rights and obliga-
tions of residency, which would establish the contacts necessary
for reasonable exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe. The
reasonableness of adjudication on the merits in this case should be
based on the fact that there was no other reasonable forum
available to plaintiffs, that the territorial jurisdiction was not
purely transitory (e.g., changing planes), and that the commit-
ment to the cause of human rights demands judicial attention.
The Second Circuit dealt with the defendant's assertion that
the customary law is not self-executing. The court stated that the
question of federal jurisdiction, which requires consideration of in-
ternational law, should not be confused with "the choice of law to
be applied, which [is] addressed at a later stage in the pro-
ceedings."39 The court noted that "the choice of law inquiry ... [is]
primarily concerned with fairness"40 and implied that the district
court could apply the law of Paraguay. Again, in this case applica-
tion of Paraguayan law would be easy if, as the court implied,
Paraguayan law casts defendant in liability. But that misses the
point. It would be a pity to reduce this case to the status of just
another tort case with a foreign element. It also flies in the face of
Judge Kaufman's assertion that "questions of this nature are
fraught with implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore
should not be left to the potentially varying adjudications of the
courts of fifty states."" This is not a diversity case; the federal
38 Id.
3 630 F.2d at 889.
0 1d.
"1 See note 7 supra.
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question involved is created by a federal statute (section 1350),
which employs international law as the jurisdictional criterion. If
one ignores all issues of the power of federal courts involving the
choice-of-law area, it is submitted that United States federal
courts do have the power to fashion a federal choice-of-law rule in
cases where jurisdiction is established under section 1350. The
court should apply international law as part of the "federal com-
mon law" if it has jurisdiction to prescribe. Even better, the court
should apply, as a matter of law, international law as international
law. In doing so, it not only would further the cause of interna-
tional law in general and human rights in particular, but it also
would avoid the charge of trying to subject the whole world to
"American law" (in applying lex fori).
